Democracy’s Deficits
Samuel Issacharoff†
Barely a quarter century after the collapse of the Soviet empire, democracy has
entered an intense period of public scrutiny. The election of President Donald Trump
and the Brexit vote are dramatic moments in a populist uprising against the postwar political consensus of liberal rule. But they are also signposts in a process long
in the making, yet perhaps not fully appreciated until the intense electoral upheavals
of recent years. The current moment is defined by distrust of the institutional order
of democracy and, more fundamentally, of the idea that there is a tomorrow and
that the losers of today may unseat the victors in a new round of electoral challenge.
At issue across the nuances of the national settings is a deep challenge to the core
claim of democracy to be the superior form of political organization of civilized
peoples.
The current democratic malaise is rooted not so much in the outcome of any
particular election but in four central institutional challenges, each one a compromise of how democracy was consolidated over the past few centuries. The four are:
first, the accelerated decline of political parties and other institutional forms of popular engagement; second, the paralysis of the legislative branches; third, the loss of
a sense of social cohesion; and fourth, the decline in state competence. While there
are no doubt other candidates for inducing anxiety over the state of democracy, these
four have a particular salience in theories of democratic superiority that make their
decline or loss a matter of grave concern. Among the great defenses of democracy
stand the claims that democracies offer the superior form of participation, of deliberation, of solidarity, and of the capacity to get the job done. We need not arbitrate
among the theories of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, solidaristic
democracy, or epistemic democratic superiority. Rather, we should note with concern
that each of these theories states a claim for the advantages of democracy, and each
faces worrisome disrepair.

INTRODUCTION
History confounds certainty. Barely a quarter century after
the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is democracy that has entered
an intense period of public scrutiny. The election of President
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Donald Trump and the Brexit vote are dramatic moments in a
populist uprising against the postwar political consensus of liberal rule. But they are also signposts in a process long in the making, yet perhaps not fully appreciated until the intense electoral
upheavals of recent years. A percentage or two change in the
Brexit vote, or a few tens of thousands of votes cast differently in
a few key US states, would certainly have postponed the confrontation but would not have altered the fundamental concerns.
With the realignment of the Dutch and French elections, the
emergence of a hard-right populism in Hungary and Poland, and
the mushrooming of antigovernance alliances in Italy and Spain,
deeper questions must be asked about the state of democracy.
Italy may have had forty-four governments in a fifty-year span,
but power generally rotated among a familiar array of parties,
personalities, and policies—until former Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi reoriented politics and the current nihilist trends
emerged.
Today’s moment is defined by the distrust of two key features
of democratic governance: the centrality of institutional order and
the commitment to what in game theory would be termed “repeat
play,” the idea that there is a tomorrow and that the losers of today may unseat the victors in a new round of electoral challenge.
The central idea of contestation, of losers and winners engaged
in common enterprise, is ceding to what Professor Jan-Werner
Müller refers to as a “permanent campaign”1 aiming to “prepare
the people for nothing less than what is conjured up as a kind of
apocalyptic confrontation.”2 In rejection of any pluralist account
of democracy, “[t]here can be no populism . . . without someone
speaking in the name of the people as a whole.”3 Populist impulses
shorten the time frame and turn everything into a binary choice,
a political life at the knife’s edge. Us or them, success or perfidy,
the people or the oligarchs, Americans or foreigners. There can be
no spirit of partial victory, of legitimate disagreement, or even of
mutual gain through engagement.
At issue across the nuances of the national settings is a deep
challenge to the core claim of democracy to be the superior form
of political organization of civilized peoples. It is odd, and highly
dispiriting, to have to engage this question so soon after democracy seemed ascendant as never before. With the collapse of the
1
2
3

Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 43 (Pennsylvania 2016).
Id at 42.
Id at 20.
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Soviet Union and its empire, the twentieth century concluded
with democracy having defeated its two great authoritarian rivals, and the popular election of governments spread across a
greater swath of the earth than ever before. The imprecise contours of ascendant democracy included generally robust markets,
welfarist protections for citizens, a broad commitment to secularism (even in countries with an established church), and liberal
tolerance of dissent and rival political organizations. All of this
was packaged in robust constitutional protections of civil liberties
and the integrity of the political order. Francis Fukuyama’s embellished claim that the end of history was upon us4 accurately
captured the sense that electoral democracy alone seemed to lay
claim to political legitimacy.5 Further, the opening to democracy
invited economic liberalization, and the resulting market exchanges were allowing huge masses to rise from poverty, even in
holdout autocratic states like China or Vietnam.
Clearly the era of democratic euphoria has ended. The rise of
Islamic terrorism and the failure of the Arab Spring were certainly warning shots, but grave as these might be, they did not
challenge the core of democratic government. The inevitable
trade-off between security and liberty that accompanies external
threats to democratic regimes is a serious challenge and can itself
compromise core legitimacy. But democracies that withstood
what Professor Philip Bobbitt terms the “long war” of the twentieth century6 were unlikely to come undone in the face of enemies
who sought to target civilians but were in no position to pose a
sustained military threat of any kind. Even the problematic military engagements in Afghanistan or Iraq bitterly divided democratic societies but did not threaten an epochal confrontation with
democracy itself.

4
See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 Natl Interest 3, 4 (Summer 1989)
(“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, . . . but the end of history
as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”).
5
At the peak of the democratic wave, in 2000, Freedom House listed 120 countries,
63 percent of all nations, as meeting the baseline criteria for democratic governance.
Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World 2000 (Freedom House, 2000), archived at
http://perma.cc/7DMN-H6EX (“[E]lectoral democracies constitute 120 of the 192 internationally recognized independent polities.”).
6
Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History xxi–
xxii (Alfred A. Knopf 2002) (“This war . . . began in 1914 and only ended in 1990. The Long
War, like previous epochal wars, brought into being a new form of the State—the marketstate.”).
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Instead, the current moment of democratic uncertainty
draws from four central institutional challenges, each one a compromise of how democracy was consolidated over the past few centuries. The four I wish to address are: first, the accelerated decline
of political parties and other institutional forms of popular engagement; second, the paralysis of the legislative branches; third,
the loss of a sense of social cohesion; and fourth, the decline in
state competence. While there are no doubt other candidates for
inducing anxiety over the state of democracy, these four have a
particular salience in theories of democratic superiority that
make their decline or loss a matter of grave concern. Among the
great defenses of democracy stand the claims that democracies
offer the superior form of participation, of deliberation, of solidarity, and of the capacity to get the job done. We need not arbitrate
among the theories of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, solidaristic democracy, or epistemic democratic superiority. Rather, we should note with concern that each of these
theories states a claim for the advantages of democracy, and each
faces worrisome disrepair.
I. PARTICIPATION: FAILING POLITICAL PARTIES
[P]olitical parties created democracy and [ ] modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.
—E.E. Schattschneider7
[P]arties [are] the distinctive, defining voluntary associations
of representative democracy.
—Nancy L. Rosenblum8
One indicator of the age of the American Constitution is the
absence of any role for political parties, by contrast to Article 21
of the German Constitution, for example.9 The Framers of the US
Constitution equated parties with factions, and aimed for a form
of democratic politics that would rise above sectional concerns,
immediate gratification of wants, and the risk of succumbing to
the passions of greed and envy. But as early as the first contested
presidential election in 1796, the Founding generation discovered
the need to coordinate national candidacies in furtherance of a

7

E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government 1 (Farrar & Rinehart 1942).
Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and
Partisanship 459 (Princeton 2008).
9
See Ger Const Art 21.
8
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political program. They quickly formed the very factions they had
sought to avoid, now organized as incipient political parties. Even
in the Founding era, partisan actors learned that they could not
mobilize the rather inert mass of the population into a national
campaign without coordination of resources, messages, and programmatic commitments for governing. Each of these undertakings required not only the right of citizens to participate electorally in self-governance, but the creation of intermediary
institutions that could mobilize citizens into partisans.
Not until the twentieth century were political parties granted
constitutional recognition as part of the fabric of democratic politics—indeed, the first nineteenth-century constitution that addressed the status of political parties was that of Colombia in
1886, and there in order to ban parties. By contrast, the constitutions of the twentieth century privileged political parties as the
galvanizing force of democratic politics.10
As experience in electoral self-government grew, democrats
throughout the world learned that parties provide a forum for the
integration of the different interests that must coalesce for successful policymaking, more so in first-past-the-post elections than
in proportional representation systems. Even in parliamentary
systems, some form of aggregation is necessary to draw sufficient
attention to the party platform and to make the party a desirable
suitor in forming a governing coalition. But mostly parties were
the institutional mechanism for translating interests and ideology into governance. Politics is the art of the possible, even if what
is possible and necessary at any particular moment fails to inspire. Without parties, responsible and productive governance
rested on the happenstance of enlightened leaders rather than an
institutionalized mechanism for taking hard decisions, cutting
deals, accepting short-term costs for longer-term gain, and all the
mechanisms that define wise stewardship.
In the United States, parties served as the political expression of the spirit of voluntary associations critical to the young
Republic. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “Americans of all ages,
all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations.

10 See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Political Institutions, in Jennifer Gandhi and
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds, Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions 101,
106 (Routledge 2015) (“In our work on the Comparative Constitutions Project, [Zachary]
Elkins, [James] Melton, and I identify certain core provisions to written constitutions. . . .
In the nineteenth century . . . few constitutions mentioned political parties, while most
written in the twentieth century do so.”).
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. . . Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the
government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United
States you will be sure to find an association.”11 By the time
Tocqueville came to America, political parties were emerging as
among the most salient of these associations. As they matured
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, parties
provided the organizational resources for political campaigns, selected candidates, coordinated platforms, and disseminated information about politics.12 In exchange, parties dispensed patronage
and access to power, the glue that held the activist wings of the
party in check and that allowed a coordinating discipline to be
imposed on the party’s elected representatives.13 As I have written elsewhere, the organizational fabric of parties came undone
in the United States in the late twentieth century, partially as a
result of legal reforms that left significant aspects of party governance outside the control of party leaders,14 and partially
through external factors, such as the rise of low-cost social media and the mechanisms of direct access to funding and the party
constituency.15
Examined globally, the American experience of tottering political parties appears emblematic rather than exceptional. The
result in country after country is the dissolution of the discipline
of political parties in favor of a politics of free agency formed
largely around the personae of individuals or momentary issues,
devoid of a sustaining institutional presence. In the American
context, Professor Richard Pildes describes this central feature of
contemporary politics as the process of political fragmentation:
“[T]he external diffusion of political power away from the political parties as a whole and the internal diffusion of power away
from the party leadership to individual party members and
officeholders.”16

11 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 979 (Floating Press 2009) (Henry
Reeve, trans) (originally published 1840).
12 See V.O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 210–11, 244 (Thomas Y.
Crowell 1942).
13 See id at 243–44; Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover
of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 Houston L Rev 845, 858 (2017).
14 See Issacharoff, 54 Houston L Rev at 864–66 (cited in note 13).
15 See id at 866–70.
16 Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 Yale L J 804, 809 (2014).
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But the breaking up of central institutions extends far beyond the domain of politics—the economic conglomerates of yesteryear, such as ITT and Gulf & Western, were long since dismantled in favor of independent specialized units.17 In the political
domain, fragmentation is a fact of life in all democratic countries,
meaning that attempts to find the causal roots at the national
level will necessarily be incomplete. The process of what is termed
“fissuring” in labor economics18 reflects the broad destabilization
of large integrated organizations in the face of technological
change, ease of communication, globalization, and other pressures on previous advantages of scale. Whether across supply
markets or in the domain of politics, ease of communication and
transportation puts pressure on broad horizontal organizations
whose prime advantage was access to markets, economic or political. In Coasean terms, it becomes less administratively burdensome to buy rather than make, and firms can become a purer form
of their particularized specialization.
The same is true in the political domain, in which access to
voters and donors is no longer coordinated through the large umbrella of the political parties. Populists eschew political parties
and social media allows direct appeals for both money and support.19 Part of the ability of populists to bypass established
party structures is no doubt the failure of the political parties
to adapt to the modern era. But the cumulative result is the
decline of the parties as the locus of democratic politics and the
rise of the individual-centered definition of politics. As parties
fragment, a spiral ensues. Targeting specific groups of voters,
activists, and donors requires more focused and generally more
17 See Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann, and Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 Am Sociological Rev 547, 563 (1994) (discussing the rapid shift away
from the conglomerate form in the 1980s, including Gulf & Western’s reorganization as
Paramount Communications); John G. Matsusaka, Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and Organizational Capabilities, 74 J Bus 409, 412–14 (2001) (charting acquisitions and divestments by Gulf & Western and ITT from 1958 to 1988). See also Edward
B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U Pa L Rev 1907, 1921–22
(2013) (describing incentives for conglomerates to spinoff “unrelated businesses” and
noting such spinoffs by Sears, CBS, DuPont, and AT&T).
18 See generally David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for
So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It (Harvard 2014).
19 For a more detailed discussion of how direct-democratic procedures, such as direct appeals to voters by populist candidates, weaken political parties, see Emanuel V.
Towfigh, et al, Do Direct-Democratic Procedures Lead to Higher Acceptance Than Political Representation? Experimental Survey Evidence from Germany, 167 Pub Choice 47,
49 (2016).
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extreme messages. Broad-tent parties become an impediment
to a new form of politics that channels passion rather than rewarding the necessarily limited returns from governance. More
broadly, the disengagement from the parties leads to what
Professor Emanuel Towfigh terms the “party paradox,” in which
parties, though necessary to democratic functioning, become a
contributing source of disenchantment with the political process:
“This paradox of representation may reduce the acceptance of
political decisions by the electorate and contribute to the overall disillusion with democracy.”20 The result, well captured by
Professor Peter Mair in his work on “hollowed out” European
democracies, is that politics “has become part of an external
world which people view from outside,” as opposed to the old
world in which they participated.21
Weakened political parties do not have the institutional fortitude to withstand hostile challenges from outsiders, as evident in the United States, where President Trump and Senator
Bernie Sanders (the former a marginal affiliate of the Republicans,
the latter not even a member of the Democratic Party) were able
to displace established party figures, and in the case of Trump,
walk away with the party endorsement and ultimately the presidency. In place of programs and governance, candidacies are
now centered on individuals and elections are framed as referenda on the leadership of those individuals. Even in Germany,
the country that has best resisted the assault on democratic institutions, there is a noted increase in the personalization of the
campaigns of Chancellor Angela Merkel.22 Candidate-driven
elections are increasingly the norm in Europe as parties that
emerged from the capacity to gain parliamentary representation

20

Id at 48–49.
Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy 43 (Verso 2013).
22 See Harald Schoen and Robert Greszki, A Third Term for a Popular Chancellor:
An Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the 2013 German Federal Election, 23 German Polit
251, 251 (2014):
21

In the 2013 German federal election, the trend towards increased electoral volatility and fragmentation continued. . . . [I]n the 2009 election the conservative
CDU/CSU fought a personalised campaign in which it aimed successfully to capitalise on Merkel’s increased popularity. In the 2013 election, the CDU/CSU
campaign was, once again, focused on Chancellor Merkel, who was now the unchallenged leader of her party.
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are no longer needed as an electoral platform.23 Even the desultory elections for the European Parliament witnessed an effort
to attract personalities to the candidate roster in a vain attempt
to boost voter turnout.24 Direct candidate appeal to voters goes
hand in hand with the documented fragmentation of political parties in, among other places, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ecuador,
Finland, France, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Thailand.25 Mair summarizes this well:
Parties are failing, in other words, as a result of a process of
mutual withdrawal or abandonment, whereby citizens retreat into private life or into more specialized and often ad
hoc forms of representation, while the party leaderships retreat into the institutions, drawing their terms of reference
ever more readily from their roles as governors or publicoffice holders.26
In this sense, the desperate gambit of Prime Minister David
Cameron to seek to solidify his political base by appealing to plebiscitary alternatives to parliament emerges from the failure of
political discipline in the legislative setting.27 It well follows the

23 See generally Chris J. Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Democracy without
Parties? Italy after Berlusconi, 85 Polit Q 23 (2014) (describing fragmentation across the
spectrum of Italian politics). See also Marc Bühlmann, David Zumbach, and Marlène
Gerber, Campaign Strategies in the 2015 Swiss National Elections: Nationalization, Coordination, and Personalization, 22 Swiss Polit Sci Rev 15, 25 (2016) (“[T]he personalization
with nationwide ‘party stars’ is a new phenomenon in Switzerland.”).
24 See, for example, Hermann Schmitt, Sara Hobolt, and Sebastian Adrian Popa, Does
Personalization Increase Turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, 16 EU Polit 347, 347–48 (2015):

The 2014 European Parliament elections were the first elections where the major political groups each nominated a lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) for the
Commission presidency in the hope that this would increase the visibility of the
elections and mobilize more citizens to turn out.
...
The potential to increase political participation was . . . at the heart of the
European Commission’s support for the Spitzenkandidaten innovation, as they
hoped this could ‘contribute to raising the turnout for European elections.’
25 See Pedro O.S. Vaz de Melo, How Many Political Parties Should Brazil Have? A
Data-Driven Method to Assess and Reduce Fragmentation in Multi-party Political Systems,
10 PLOS One 1, 2 (Oct 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/27ZA-2EY2.
26 Mair, Ruling the Void at 16 (cited in note 21).
27 See David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU (BBC, Jan 23, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/DAG4-RGHX (describing pressures that Cameron faced from
within his own Conservative Party and from challenger UKIP that pushed him to call
for the Brexit referendum); Tom McTague, Alex Spence, and Edward-Isaac Dovere, How
David Cameron Blew It (Politico, Sept 12, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X4AP-MGL2
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pattern in the European Union of seeking to alter its perceived
democratic deficit through greater use of referenda and other
tools of direct democracy.28 Put less delicately, Nigel Farage, the
leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), touted the Brexit
vote as the story of the British people telling the political elite to
stick it: “It is, after all, rather extraordinary that more than half
the voting population defied a large majority of its own elected
parliament, all of the traditional political parties, and virtually
every important institution in the country—from the Central
Bank to the leaders of industry to the trade unions.”29 Nor did the
Brexit fiasco prevent embattled Italian Prime Minister Matteo
Renzi from turning to a constitutional referendum to shore up his
government in 2016, with the same disastrous results.30 The immediate need to seek political ballast through a plebiscite may
reflect the momentary political crises in Britain or Italy. But the
allure of referenda reflects the disenchantment with political parties, and the desperate effort to restore governing authority
simply confirms the weakness of parliaments as authoritative institutions. Rather than offering a lifeline to government, these
referenda are a desperate gambit reflecting the problems that
gave rise to Brexit in the first place: “[T]ensions have grown in
most Western nations between the existing processes of representative democracy and calls by reformists for a more participatory style of democratic government.”31
If Brexit highlights the perceived weakness of political parties as coordinators of democratic politics, it raises the question
of the root cause of that weakness. In substantial part, the weakness follows from the simple fact that the parties cannot claim
to speak for much of a constituency. In other words, they have
significantly lost their participatory quality. To give but one example, in 1950, 20 percent of Britons were members of political
(describing organizational and legislative failures by Cameron’s Conservative Party preceding the Brexit referendum).
28 See, for example, Andres Auer, European Citizens’ Initiative: Article I-46.43 1 Eur
Const L Rev 79, 79 (2005) (outlining the EU’s “new device of participatory democracy”).
29 Jeremy Shapiro, Brexit Was a Rejection of Britain’s Governing Elite. Too Bad the
Elites Were Right. (Vox, June 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9586-AQA7.
30 See Jason Horowitz, Italy’s Premier, Matteo Renzi, Says He’ll Resign after Reform
Is Rejected (NY Times, Dec 4, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/12/04/world/europe/italy-matteo-renzi-referendum.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0
(visited Oct 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (“Prime Minister Matteo Renzi said he
would resign after voters decisively rejected constitutional changes.”).
31 Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm Bürklin, and Andrew Drummond, Public Opinion and
Direct Democracy, 12 J Democracy 141, 141 (Oct 2001).
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parties; as of 2014, that figure was about 1 percent.32 In the
United States, according to the Pew Research Center’s yearly
studies of American political behavior, party identification is at
an observed all-time low. Currently, 39 percent of Americans
identify as independents, 32 percent as Democrats, and 23 percent as Republicans: “This is the highest percentage of independents in more than 75 years of public opinion polling.”33
Party failures are intrinsically connected to the demise of the
institutional supports of those parties. Throughout the twentieth
century, parties relied heavily on other forms of organization to
provide their active constituency. For the Democratic Party in the
United States, for the Labour Party in Britain, and for the socialdemocratic parties of Western Europe, that organizational backing came heavily from the labor unions.34 For the Republicans in
the United States and the Tories in Britain, and the Christian
democrats and conservative parties in Europe, the organizational
ties were to the chambers of commerce or other locally based representatives of small businesses and agricultural interests.35
Taking the United States as an example, the decline of underlying institutions is as precipitous as the decline of parties.
Union density today is at an all-time low since the New Deal created federally mandated rights of collective bargaining. Union decline captures only a part of the picture. Significant as well is the
shift in composition of the unionized workforce reflected in the
domination of unionization in the public sector. While about 11
percent of the American workforce is unionized, the figure for the
private sector has fallen below 7 percent, while public sector unionization remains at about 35 percent.36 Not only have unions
declined outright, but perhaps more significantly, they have

32 What’s Gone Wrong with Democracy (The Economist, Mar 1, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/2KWC-8XCH.
33 Trends in Party Identification, 1939–2014 (Pew Research Center, Apr 7, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/N9C8-SZBM.
34 See generally J. David Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (Knopf 1969) (documenting American labor’s symbiotic relationship with the Democratic Party through the
first half of the twentieth century); Peter L. Francia, Assessing the Labor-Democratic Party
Alliance: A One-Sided Relationship?, 42 Polity 293 (2010) (contrasting modern organized
labor’s continued support for Democratic candidates with Democratic failures to deliver
pro-labor policy).
35 See generally Daniel Ziblatt, Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy
(Cambridge 2017) (chronicling the organizational rise of the British and German conservative parties).
36 Megan Dunn and James Walker, Union Membership in the United States *2–4 (US
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sept 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5VPC-YDKB.
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ceased to be an independent source of support for political parties
outside the state realm. To the extent that unions centrally become the expression of public employees, they no longer organize
a constituency independent of the political realm. Instead, labor
unions are largely an expression of the political party to which
they are affiliated, and become another political actor whose fortunes are tied to that party’s electoral capabilities.37 Not surprisingly, efforts to consolidate Republican political power at the state
level, as exemplified by Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin, seek
to undermine the power of public-sector unions as a proxy for the
Democratic Party. These are not battles reflective of participatory
engagement by diverse sectors of the society, but power struggles
within the state itself.
On the other side of the ledger, we find a corresponding erosion of broadscale institutional engagement. In the United States
the best example comes from the evolution of the Chamber of
Commerce from the organizational representative of local enterprise to the exponent of the interests of concentrated capital:
“Mention the Chamber of Commerce, and most people think of a
benign organization comprised mostly of small business owners
who meet for networking and mutual support in local chapters
across the U.S. But today’s Chamber is anything but that.”38 The
Chamber’s interests are now highly focused around a small number of industries and interests, including “tobacco, banking, and
fossil fuels.”39 According to one article, 64 donors were responsible
for more than 50 percent of all donations to the Chamber, while

37 The concern over the legal implications of the distinct role of public-sector unionism in the United States goes back at least to Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter
Jr, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 Yale L J 1107, 1116,
1124–25 (1969).
38 David Brodwin, The Chamber’s Secrets (US News & World Report, Oct 22, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/8SJU-E53D. See also generally Alyssa Katz, The Influence
Machine: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Corporate Capture of American Life
(Spiegel & Grau 2015).
39 Brodwin, The Chamber’s Secrets (cited in note 38):

Founded in 1912, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been shaped by its CEO
Tom Donohue into a powerful lobbying and campaigning machine that pursues
a fairly narrow special-interest agenda. It’s now the largest lobbying organization in the U.S. (ranked by budget). It mostly represents the interests of a handful of so-called “legacy industries”—industries like tobacco, banking and fossil
fuels which have been around for generations and learned how to parley their
earnings into political influence. The Chamber seeks favorable treatment for
them, for example, through trade negotiations, tax treatment, regulations and
judicial rulings.
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94 percent of its donations came from a pool of just 1,500 top
donors.40
Across the political spectrum, parties become tied not to
broad-based constituency organizations, but to much narrower
sectional interests, already well entrenched in the corridors of
power. The claim of parties as a special arena of participatory engagement in the democratic project wanes accordingly. The parties emerge hollowed out, just as do their organizational bases of
support.
II. DELIBERATION: THE WEAKNESS OF LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
[Deliberative] collective decision-making ought to be different
from bargaining, contracting and other market-type interactions,
both in its explicit attention to considerations of the common advantage and in the ways that that attention helps to form the aims
of the participants.
—Joshua Cohen41
[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.
—Joseph A. Schumpeter42
Rarely would Professor Joshua Cohen and Joseph Schumpeter
be lumped together in theories of democratic legitimacy. Yet they
both look to a discursive element to raise the capacity of democratic governance to reach the common good, and to reach beyond
mere sectional claims on spoils. For Cohen and the more classic
deliberativist tradition, the domain of discourse is in public participation and direct engagement.43 For Schumpeter and those in
his tradition, myself included, elite competition in the electoral
arena provides the foundations for citizen engagement and education, and the ensuing retrospective accountability for the exercise of governmental power.44
40 Id. See also Katz, The Influence Machine at xiii (cited in note 38) (discussing the
“undisclosed financial contributions to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce” made by “industries that provide vital goods and services but at mounting costs to society”).
41 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin and Philip
Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17, 17 (Basil Blackwell 1989).
42 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 250 (George Allen
& Unwin 1976) (originally published 1942).
43 Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy at 21–26 (cited in note 41).
44 See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 247–49 (cited in note 42).
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Under either view, democratic political theory justly emphasizes the educational gains of deliberation in an engaged citizenry.45 Even when citizens in modern democracies govern
through representatives rather than as a collective body, periodic
elections guarantee that citizens encounter political arguments
that may be removed from their everyday lives.46 Elections compel
deliberation among the citizenry as candidates and parties attempt to sway and educate. That deliberation then translates into
the legislative arena as elected officials seek to translate campaign promises into governing policies.
For present purposes, we limit our discussion to the institutionalization of deliberation in the legislative arena rather than
in the lived experiences of the citizenry. Democracies are conceived around legislative power, from Magna Carta’s parliamentary check on the Crown, to the expansive role of Congress defined
by Article I of the Constitution, to the revolutionary emergence of
parliamentary power throughout the nineteenth century. Colloquially, Americans once spoke of the Senate as the “world’s greatest deliberative body.”47 It is no overstatement to say that this is
the world’s ennobling democratic inheritance. Or, put another
way, the hallmark moments of twentieth-century authoritarian
rule are intertwined with the rejection of parliamentary deliberation and with compromise in favor of the plebiscitary triumphs
of a Hitler or Mussolini.48
The legislative arena, at least in theory, is the clearest institutionalized setting for democratic deliberation. In its classic rendition, it is the arena in which “participants of deliberation, before
counting votes, are open to transform their preferences in the

45

See Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy at 18–20 (cited in note 41).
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 248–49 (cited in note 42).
47 See George Packer, The Empty Chamber (New Yorker, Aug 9, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/SR7D-72JJ.
48 Hitler’s regime consolidated power through a number of direct referenda in the
1930s, including those withdrawing Germany from the League of Nations and combining
the offices of chancellor and president into that of the führer. These referenda were initiated and controlled by the German executive branch. See generally Arnold J. Zurcher, The
Hitler Referenda, 29 Am Polit Sci Rev 91 (1935). In Italy, Mussolini maneuvered to give
the Fascist Grand Council the power to approve election lists throughout the 1920s,
shifting the Italian parliament from a deliberative (though gridlocked) electoral body to
a single-party “Corporative Chamber” approved by popular plebiscite: “Our aim is to create a Corporative Chamber without an opposition. We have no desire nor need for any
political opposition.” The Fascist Grand Council and the Italian Election, 5 Bull Intl News
3, 4 (1929) (quoting Mussolini).
46

2018]

Democracy’s Deficits

499

light of well-articulated and persuasive arguments.”49 On this
view, the process of deliberation transforms democratic politics
because it “requires the participants to display the reasons why
they support a particular stand. It comprehends an exercise of
mutual justification that allows a thorough type of dialogue before a collective decision is taken.”50
Yet, in the modern era, the words “Congress” and “dysfunction” seem to go together like a horse and carriage, with some
apology to Frank Sinatra. Consider that the total enacted legislation annually by the US Congress has declined considerably from
the 1970s, in which as many as 804 bills were passed, to the most
recently finished Congress, in which only 329 bills were passed.51
But focusing on the United States misses much of the picture.
Across a number of markers, the legislative branches of mature
democracies have declined as centers of policy debate and formation. In their place, executives have adopted more muscular
policymaking roles, checked primarily by courts.
This is a large topic to which I have devoted an entire monograph.52 But for the current presentation, consider just one partial indicator of the trend over time in the United States. Since
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fabled first hundred days in office ushered in the transformative New Deal, presidents have routinely devoted themselves to hitting the ground running, using
the initial period of pride among the partisans and disorganization among the vanquished to show muscular leadership. The effort to blaze through the first hundred days has not changed, but
the form has. The number of legislative initiatives of the first hundred days has dropped steadily, from seventy-six new statutes
under Roosevelt, to seven and fourteen under Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, respectively. 53 Even
though, of course, presidents do not pass legislation, and even
though they might often confront a Congress or a chamber with
an opposition majority, the drop-off does not mean presidential
49 Conrado Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy 14
(Oxford 2013).
50 Id at 15.
51 Statistics
and
Historical
Comparison
(GovTrack),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/3BVH-AT7D (showing that the 95th Congress passed 804 bills while the
114th Congress passed 329).
52 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the
Era of Constitutional Courts (Cambridge 2015).
53 Julia Azari, A President’s First 100 Days Really Do Matter (FiveThirtyEight, Jan
17, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/852T-G5DF.
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inaction. While legislation has dropped, executive decrees have
increased throughout the modern period. Consistent with this
trend, President Trump had no significant legislative activity at
all during his first hundred days in office, and the number of substantial legislative initiatives amounted to zero.54
The failure of the participatory side of democratic politics ties
directly to the difficulties encountered on the deliberative side.
Parliamentary democracies are centered on the parties. Candidates run as part of a slate, and the demand for a larger share of
seats in parliament is what offers the prospect of national stewardship. In theory, there are so many competing interests, and
such inconsistency in potential political outcomes depending on
who has control of setting the agenda and deciding what is presented in what form, that there is a risk of complete incoherence
in the legislative process.55 The cycling-of-preferences problem,
the great insight of Professor Kenneth Arrow and the ensuing
study of public-choice theory, threatens to collapse the capacity of
any legislative body charged with policy leadership.56 The need for
coordination is apparent, with the Supreme Court long ago observing that parties emerged “so as to coordinate efforts to secure
needed legislation and oppose that deemed undesirable.”57
The result of parliamentary dysfunction is correspondingly
rising executive unilateralism,58 the increased dependence on administrative law to set policy, and the central checking role of the
courts as restraints on presidentialism—even in formally parliamentary systems. Doctrinally, the absence of congressional action
not only removes the central democratic branch from the reins of
54 The major congressional actions took the form of an expedited procedure to withdraw regulatory decrees within a fast-track window. There were no new legislative initiatives of any substance. See David Leonhardt, Donald Trump’s First 100 Days: The Worst
on Record (NY Times, Apr 26, 2017), online at http://nyti.ms/2pleYVE (visited Oct 11,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
55 See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J Polit
Economy 328, 328–31 (1950) (discussing the confusion attendant to any attempt to amalgamate the social and voting preferences of a diverse whole).
56 See generally id (laying out Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the inevitability of
preference cycling). See also Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90
Colum L Rev 2121, 2183–86 (1990) (arguing that institutional arrangements may mediate
Arrow’s predicted cycling).
57 Ray v Blair, 343 US 214, 221 (1952).
58 See generally Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Approach to Rights during Wartime,
5 Theoretical Inquiries L 1 (2004) (surveying the response of American courts in periods
of crisis when the executive asserts a need for unilateral action).
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government, but also makes judicial constraint more difficult.
Following Justice Robert Jackson’s famous Steel Seizure typology,
the power of the executive is at its “lowest ebb” when the president seeks to countermand the actions of Congress.59 The unstated flip side of Jackson’s observation is that the pathway for
judicial repudiation of executive action is correspondingly easier
when Congress has blazed the trail. When Congress fails to act,
the mechanisms of democratic constraint are compromised.
For Jackson, congressional inaction posed the most difficult
issues for democratic governance and, by extension, for the judiciary. As he framed the problem:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.60
In the absence of legislative initiative, executive power naturally rushes to fill the void, whether through governance by direct
decree or by indirect administrative command. Without the legislative branch offsetting the powers of the executive, the job of defining the boundaries of prerogative power and regulatory authority falls to the judiciary. As Jackson cautioned, the lines of judicial
engagement are least clear—the “zone of twilight”61—when there
is institutional failure in the legislature, and the “least dangerous
branch” finds itself at risk of open conflict with the executive.62
There is nothing distinctly American about hypertrophic executive power in the modern era. Even before the UK Supreme

59 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 636–38 (1952) (Jackson
concurring).
60 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring).
61 Id (Jackson concurring).
62 How this conflict plays out is the subject of Rosalind Dixon and Samuel Issacharoff,
Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 Wis L Rev
683, 706.
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Court had to engage the authority of the prime minister to implement Brexit, a topic to which I shall return in concluding,63 the
British government confronted the military consequences of executive unilateralism in the disastrous Iraqi campaign.64 One
proposal, from the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution, would have implemented limitations similar to
those of the American War Powers Act,65 obligating parliamentary approval for any long-term military engagement.66 As future
Prime Minister Gordon Brown observed at the time, “Now that
there has been a vote on these issues so clearly and in such controversial circumstances, I think it is unlikely that except in the
most exceptional circumstances a government would choose not
to have a vote in Parliament [before deploying troops].”67 The lack
of accountability and the absence of parliamentary engagement
was confirmed by the 2016 Chilcot Report, whose many condemnations of Prime Minister Tony Blair included criticism of unilateral decisionmaking by the executive.68
It is not possible in this one exposition to engage the extensive discussions at the level of national democracies on parliamentary failure to check the executive. A review of the literature
shows a persistent theme among both academic commentators
and pundits to be the collapse of responsible government at the

63

See notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
See generally House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Waging War:
Parliament’s Role and Responsibility (HL Paper 236-I, July 26, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/MF99-F78K.
65 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et seq.
66 Waging War at *5 (cited in note 64) (“The purpose of our inquiry has been to
consider what alternatives there are to the use of the Royal prerogative power in the
deployment of armed force . . . and in particular whether Parliamentary approval should
be required for any deployment of British forces outside the United Kingdom.”). In the
following years, the interplay between the prime minister and Parliament developed informally, until the point in 2014 when “the prime minister acknowledged that a convention
of Commons approval now existed.” Philippe Lagassé, Parliament and the War Prerogative
in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and
Legislative Control, 70 Parliamentary Aff 280, 289 (2017).
67 Brown Calls for MPs to Decide War (BBC News, Apr 30, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/86MH-QDHX.
68 See The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, HC 264, 58, 83 (July 6,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/H5T3-EWNR (critiquing Blair’s actions, the report
noted that “there should have been a collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small
group of Ministers on the basis of inter-departmental advice agreed at a senior level between officials at a number of decision points which had a major impact on the development of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq”).
64
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parliamentary level.69 The causes for that collapse identified in
the academic literature include concerns about thresholds of representation, party fragmentation, increasing presidentialism and
semipresidentialism, and the displacement of parliamentary authority by international accords or, in the case of Europe, the
overreach of Brussels.70 Pundits are more inclined to point to the
venality or corruption of parliamentary officials, though in some
countries, such as Brazil, the two come together.71
69 See, for example, Michael Foley, The British Presidency: Tony Blair and the Politics of Public Leadership 108 (Manchester 2000) (noting “that Blair and his followers operated on the assumption that parliament was no longer a central force of political significance”); Zachary Karabell, How the GOP Made Obama One of America’s Most Powerful
Presidents (Politico, Apr 14, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AN8D-BBHE (positing that
Republicans in Congress as “the so-called Party of No only provoked the Obama administration into finding innovative ways to exercise [greater unilateral] power . . . . Rather
than containing the White House, congressional Republicans liberated it”).
70 See generally, for example, Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw U L Rev 1
(2012) (describing how regulations passed in Brussels can result in the globalization of
standards); Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 Colum L Rev 1689 (2015) (synthesizing political science literature about
congressional polarization); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutional Framework of Analysis, 15 Eur J Intl L 907 (2004) (discussing conflicts between
international law and national domestic self-government); Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J Democracy 51 (Winter 1990) (arguing that presidentialism is less conducive to democracy than parliamentarism); Melanie Amann, Thomas Darnstädt, and
Dietmar Hipp, Is Germany’s Parliamentary Hurdle Obsolete? (Spiegel Online, Oct 4, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/9GG5-RT8Z (surveying political scientists’ critiques of the
Bundestag’s 5 percent hurdle to seat parties). See also, for example, Pildes, 124 Yale L J
at 809 (cited in note 16) (positing that political fragmentation is a cause of recent government dysfunction, such as “the inability of party leaders to bring along recalcitrant minority factions of their parties”).
71 An astonishing number of Brazil’s members of Congress have faced indictment in
recent years. See, for example, Anthony Boadle and Alonso Soto, Brazil’s Indicted Senate
Head Removed by Supreme Court (Reuters, Dec 5, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/34HH-ER3N (reporting the removal of the Senate president following an
indictment); Paul Kiernan, Brazil Former Official Is Sentenced, Wall St J A7 (Mar 31,
2017) (reporting the sentencing of the former House Speaker Eduardo Cunha to prison for
corruption “in a case that has landed scores of politicians and businessmen behind bars”);
Dom Phillips, Prominent Leader Is Sentenced in Brazil, NY Times A9 (Mar 31, 2017) (reporting the sentencing of the former House speaker to “one of [the] stiffest penalties meted
out to a top political figure in Brazil in recent years,” as part of an investigation that “has
shaken Brazil’s political and business establishments to their core”). The problem is not
limited to Congress, as shown by the conviction and sentencing of former President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva, see Ernesto Londoño, Ex-President of Brazil Sentenced to Nearly 10
Years in Prison for Corruption (NY Times, July 12, 2017), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/world/americas/brazil-lula-da-silva-corruption.html (visited Oct
11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable), and by the explosive public removal trial of current
President Michel Temer, resulting in a divided vote of the Electoral Court on his removal.
See Simon Romero and Dom Phillips, Court in Brazil Clears President Michel Temer in
Campaign Finance Case (NY Times, June 9, 2017), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/americas/brazil-michel-temer.html (visited Oct 11, 2017)
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Parliamentary democracies are centered on the parties. Candidates run as part of a slate and the demand for a larger share
of seats in parliament is what offers the prospect of national stewardship. The collapse of parliaments compounds the consequences of the collapse of parties, and the two are both the cause
and effect of each other. Invariably, the locus of political activity
shifts to the executive, and the defining feature of democratic politics turns to the triumphalist claims of the victorious head of
state. Consider this account of contemporary politics:
What we are seeing in the presidential campaigns . . . is that
the more chance the candidates have of winning—or the more
chance they think they have of winning—the more they are
prepared to play the game that I call “national presidentialism.” They go in for speeches that amount to saying: “If I’m
elected, then everything . . . is going to be different because
I’m the only one able to lead this country.” . . . All that matters is how the candidate is going to be able to restore [the
nation’s] image once he or she has been given supreme
power.72
This account of contemporary politics would ring true in many
democracies around the world, the United States clearly included.
In my native Argentina, such “caudillo politics”73 has generally
been the mark of the demise of democracy rather than its fulfillment. That this particular statement happens to be about France
and that the speaker is Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the 1968
student uprising, only makes it a bit more piquant.74

(Perma archive unavailable). See also Dom Phillips, President Michel Temer of Brazil Is
Charged with Corruption (NY Times, June 26, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes
.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/brazil-temer-corruption-charge-joesley-batista.html (visited Oct 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (detailing new bribery allegations against
Temer).
72 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Presidentialism: The French Disease (Esprit, Feb 22, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/BCS7-HHDT.
73 The caudillo is the military man on a horse leading a highly personalized political
movement based on swashbuckling individual authority, rather than lasting political institutions. The nineteenth-century form of caudillo command, called the caudillaje, is the
precursor of both populism and military rule. See Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen,
Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis, 9 Comp Stud Society & Hist 168, 168–69 (1967).
See also Diego von Vacano, Trump Embraces Caudillo Politics as Latin America Shuns It
(NBC News, Nov 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4MMG-4TAV.
74 See Cohn-Bendit, Presidentialism (cited in note 72).

2018]

Democracy’s Deficits

505

III. SOLIDARITY: THE THREATS TO SOCIAL COHESION
A central theme of my work on Fragile Democracies concerns
the inherent difficulty in democratic governance in the absence of
a democratic polity. Strikingly, and perhaps paradoxically, elections are seen in post–World War II state formation as the means
toward the creation of a democratic state rather than a system of
choice among those already committed to a common enterprise of
collective governance.75 In countries emerging from colonial rule
or despotic regimes, elections were the confirmation of a democratic transformation, even as they often served as the marker
of who would hold state authority in a world of unfinished “usversus-them” business.76 Our era of diversity may applaud the
benefits of such broad democratic aspirations, but citizens of
Burundi or Bosnia-Herzegovina or Iraq would well understand
the frailties of democracy without a solidaristic commitment to a
collective future.
The role of communitarian solidarity suffers from the traumas of the twentieth century, from Nazism to the ethnic slaughter in the Balkans. One reads back with horror at Carl Schmitt
proclaiming that “[d]emocracy requires [ ] first homogeneity and
second . . . elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.”77 The unmistakable message is that “[a] democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something
foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity.”78
Yet, a look back at our democratic inheritance shows how central earlier generations thought the sense of shared identity, and
that the ties between social cohesion and self-government are not
an invention of twentieth-century reaction. In the background of
the Founding documents of constitutionalism in the United
States is the claim, no doubt jarring from a slave society, that the
American blessing of liberty could be traced to the conception of
homogeneity of the population, a claim that hauntingly echoes in
Schmitt. In the words of John Jay, in Federalist 2:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people, a people descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same
75

See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies at 2 (cited in note 52).
See id at 2–3.
77 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 9 (MIT 1988) (Ellen Kennedy, trans) (originally published 1923).
78 Id.
76
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religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint
counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established their general
Liberty and Independence.79
Jay may today be the least celebrated of the authors of The
Federalist Papers, but the sentiment was widely shared, with
John Stuart Mill later extending the argument to make it not
simply an observation about America but a prerequisite for democracy: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country
made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellowfeeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the
united public opinion necessary to the working of representative
government can not exist.”80
Liberal theorists, notably including John Rawls, continued
into the twentieth century the tradition of making claims for just
treatment of citizens turn, at least in part, on a shared sense of
“political traditions and institutions of law, property, and class
structure, with their sustaining religious and moral beliefs and
underlying culture. It is these things that shape a society’s political will.”81 The arguments do not sound in the need for consanguinity so much as the continued importance of a sense of collective identity in order to sustain citizen self-government.
Democratic politics has long provided a critical forum in which
solidarity could blossom. Across democratic societies, political
parties provided the organizational framework for sports leagues,
adult education projects, and newspapers—all of which served as
intermediaries between citizens and the broader society. These
agencies of civil society are weakened and leave citizens increasingly disengaged from political life, as reflected in declining voter
participation rates across the democratic world. The problem of a
lack of collective identity is more acute at the higher levels of efforts at European governance being compromised by trying to
craft a democracy without a demos.
Among the contemporary challenges in advanced democratic societies are significant erosions in the sense of collective
solidarity that provided the historic glue for the common project

79

Federalist 2 (Jay), in The Federalist 8, 9 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 344–45 (Floating
Press 2009) (originally published 1861).
81 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 106 (Harvard 1999).
80
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of democratic governance. For immediate purposes, I focus on
two: the challenge of immigration and the challenge of declining
living standards of the broad mass of the population—the toilers
and voters of democratic states. There are many manifestations
of contemporary social dissolution. But the combination of economic insecurity and the presence of perceived outsiders seems
invariably to lead to fear of the other as taking over and blame on
the other for a corresponding loss in social standing and wealth.
The point here is not the normative claim that this sense is or is
not justified, or even the positive claim of a causal relation between immigration and economic malaise. Rather, the issue is the
democratic challenge posed by widespread sentiments among the
laboring classes of being under siege. There is not a populist
movement in a western democracy at present that does not play
to both xenophobia and economic insecurity. The immediate question is why these strains have such force at present, and why they
seem to operate in tandem.
While the answers are no doubt complex, they must begin
with an assessment of the empirical realities of modern democratic societies, still reeling from the financial meltdown of 2008.
The brute fact is that there is a loss of cohesion that accompanies
high periods of immigration until the new immigrants are integrated into the national consensus.82 What Americans celebrate
as the melting pot is undoubtedly a process of change and recreation of the national identity, but provides for mechanisms of integration of waves of immigrant populations. Even in the best of
circumstances, the process of integration and the corresponding
accommodation of prior governing values will take time. What
hopefully ends up a richer cultural environment (oftentimes with
side improvements from food to music) invariably begins as a project of social and linguistic strain.
Taking the United States as the key example, Figure 1 shows
that there is no escaping the fact that immigration has risen dramatically in the past quarter century and that the level of foreignborn Americans is at its highest in a century—precisely the time
of the last great burst of nativist populism in the United States.

82 See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the TwentyFirst Century, 30 Scandinavian Polit Stud 137, 141–54 (2007) (discussing the relationship
between diversity—and, by extension, immigration—and social isolation in American
communities). See also Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist’s Perspective, 1 Persp Polit 103, 105–07 (2003) (charting heterogeneity and voluntary civic participation in twentieth-century America).
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR SHARE OF THE
TOTAL US POPULATION, 1850–201583

What is striking here, apart from any concerns about the distribution of immigrant labor skill levels, or even the number of
legal versus illegal immigrants, is just the sheer number. The last
immigration-fueled nativist turn transformed American politics
for a generation, including closed-border constraints on immigration, isolationist politics, and even Prohibition directed at the
drinking habits of recent immigrants.
The challenge of immigration emerges politically in tandem
with the sense of loss in the economic sphere. In what is referred
to as the “elephant curve,” produced by the World Bank and reproduced in Figure 2 below, there is a graphic depiction of a global
redirection of wealth over the twenty-year period leading into the

83 US Immigrant Population and Share over Time, 1850–Present (Migration Policy
Inst), archived at http://perma.cc/3Q6T-6AY8.
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financial meltdown, perhaps as significant as any ever recorded.84
The graph shows a stunning rise in the real incomes of the great
majority of the world’s population, with huge numbers being
lifted from poverty—primarily, though not exclusively, the result
of the Chinese economic transformation.
FIGURE 2. GLOBAL INCOME GROWTH FROM 1988 TO 200885

With the exception of the very poorest of the poor, the past
thirty years have witnessed a transformation of lives around the
world from extreme poverty to levels of income, health, material
possessions, and life prospects that begin to challenge those of the
advanced industrial democracies. The graph further reflects the
rise of finance and the dominance of the top 1 percent, a subject
of democratic challenge for some form of equitable redistribution.
But the most important part of this chart is the downward curve
at which real levels of income variously increased at significantly
lower rates, stagnated, or even decreased over the same twentyyear period. This is the two deciles of the world’s population found
84 See Branko Milanovic, Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and
Now *7–8 (World Bank 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Q3U3-5EL8 (comparing different measures of global inequality and concluding that the period of globalization running
from 1988 to 2008 witnessed “a decline in global inequality” for “perhaps [ ] the first time
since the Industrial Revolution”).
85 Id.
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at roughly the 65th to 85th percentiles of world income distribution. That group is roughly the working classes and lower middle
classes of the advanced industrial countries that form the longeststanding core of democratic societies.
As a normative matter, redistribution from wealthier nations
to poorer ones in a period of rising wealth must be applauded. The
economic dislocations in the advanced industrial countries translate on the ground into hundreds and hundreds of millions of people being lifted from truly destitute conditions. But the global processes that have done much to alleviate human suffering do not
dampen the consequences of the inability of the advanced societies to cushion the domestic effects of international migration and
global economic integration or to redistribute internally from the
winners to the losers of globalization.
The democratic sense of solidarity comes under siege as the
laboring backbones of the advanced industrial countries find
themselves challenged by a lost sense of recognizing their country
amid rapidly changing demographics. It also comes as the rest of
the world is exerting downward pressures on their living standards and as wealth shifts markedly to other parts of the world.
As voters, these threatened groups in advanced societies were the
backbone of the major parties of twentieth-century democracy—
the labor and social-democratic parties on the left, and the
Christian democratic and center parties on the right.
Both labor and the center-right parties were traditionally
cautious to be negative on immigration and cross-border trade.86
While their policies differed, each saw a central part of its political
role as protecting the always vulnerable working class and small
entrepreneurial class, including the highly subsidized agricultural classes in countries like France, from economic dislocation.
Both immigrants and the entry of cheaper goods from abroad
threatened the less dynamic sectors of the advanced world economies. This is especially true for the working classes. Private-sector
labor unions saw immigration as a source of downward pressure
86 This tradition is clearest in the breach. See Thomas R. Rochon and Ravi Roy, Adaptation of the American Democratic Party in an Era of Globalization, 31 Intl J Polit Economy 12, 18–24 (Fall 2001) (documenting the Democrats’ shift from a primarily workingclass to middle-class party and the ensuing changes in trade policy in the 1990s). Thus
NAFTA was pitched by not only the Reagan and Bush administrations, but by the Clinton
administration as protecting not only jobs but ensuring popular demand for accessible
consumer goods. See Michael Wilson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Ronald
Reagan’s Vision Realized (Heritage Foundation, Nov 23, 1993), archived at
http://perma.cc/6Q46-LFN5.
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on wages and resisted it as such. By contrast, public-sector unions
primarily attend to the level of government expenditures on employment and tend to be neither protectionist on trade nor cautious on immigration.87 When we look to the upper Midwest voting
for President Trump, the decayed industrial north of England voting for Brexit, or the frayed industrial towns of northern France
voting for the National Front, the message of governmental failure to provide for basic social security rings loudly. And, when
coupled with the sense of the traditional institutions being disengaged from working class concerns, the field is left open to populist anger, whether from the right or left.
Indeed, the message resonates in those communities feeling
left behind. One simple measure in the United States is to break
down the vote by county, the basic unit of local governance. Trump
won roughly five times as many counties as Hillary Clinton, but
the counties that Clinton won included almost all the largest and
most dynamic urban areas of the country—indeed, although a numerical minority, the counties won by Clinton generated 64 percent of the national gross domestic product.88 In Britain, the
same pattern obtained in the Brexit vote. Leaving aside Scotland
and the eastern precincts of Northern Ireland (where voters
were probably more inclined to leave the United Kingdom than
the European Union), the Brexit vote matched the economic prospects of the local populations. Brexit lost in London and the relatively prosperous South, and carried most of the rest of the country, save for a few areas of economic resurrection in Manchester
and Liverpool.89 Put another way, Brexit was the dominant choice
of those over forty, the generations that had felt declining wage

87 See, for example, Alana Semuels, Why Are Unions So Worried about an Upcoming
Supreme Court Case? (The Atlantic, Jan 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AQU2-EQHG
(noting the argument that a change to public-sector unions’ fee structures would pressure
them to take more “hardline negotiating positions” on issues like salaries in order to prove
their worth to employees).
88 See Mark Muro and Sifan Liu, Another Clinton-Trump Divide: High-Output America
vs Low-Output America (Brookings, Nov 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/63QB-BS4J;
Jim Tankersley, Donald Trump Lost Most of the American Economy in This Election
(Wash Post, Nov 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3U86-WRUD.
89 See EU Referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts (BBC, June 24, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4JN2-55SM.
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prospects, but not the generation under forty.90 Comparable distributions could be found in the French presidential elections, as
well.91
The groups threatened by declining economic prospects, a
sense of isolation in their own countries, and the combined effects
of foreign threat delivered Brexit and Trump’s victories in the upper Midwest. Now feeling vulnerable, these voters are increasingly deserting their former political affiliations in favor of angry
populist reactions, frequently led by demagogic appeals to isolation
and the sense of lost horizons. From Brexit to Italy’s Five Star
Movement to Trump to the National Front to Spain’s Podemos, the
trends are dramatic. The historic array of postwar political parties offered neither economic security nor a sense of political protection from outsiders, and were displaced by those much closer
to the sense of populist dismay.
In particular, the financial crisis of 2008 appears to have been
the defining blow that exposed the frailty of democracies. The
sudden economic dislocation stressed the already weak political
institutions of governance and the ability of traditional political
parties to offer prospects of remediation.92 For the laboring classes
of the advanced democracies, for whom the decades leading to
2008 had often offered a steady decline in relative real-wage
growth, confidence in any remnant of the political status quo to
cushion the further postcrisis economic decline was exceedingly
low.93 Without functioning politics, democracies are ill prepared
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See id.
While President Emmanuel Macron bested Marine Le Pen in all but two departments during the final round of voting, Le Pen’s support was strongest in the rural, deindustrialized northeast and the southern coast. French Presidential Election May 2017—
Full Second Round Results and Analysis (The Guardian, May 26, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/6VKE-8BPS.
92 See Steven Mufson, Why Obama Says Bank Reform Is a Success but Bernie Sanders
Says It’s a Failure (Wash Post Wonkblog, Mar 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6N6T9BSN (discussing internecine debates surrounding the failure to prosecute bankers and
break up banks postcrisis). See also Justin Fox, What We’ve Learned from the Financial
Crisis (Harvard Business Review, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9L4E-TP4L (noting how “unanimity [of opinion on macroeconomic policy] quickly unraveled” among economists after the 2008 financial bailout).
93 For an exploration of the postcrisis class rift on the American right, see
Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol, and John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 Persp Polit 25, 32–34 (2011) (noting that Tea Party
conservatives’ embrace of social-safety-net spending is at odds with Republican orthodoxy). See also David Frum, The Great Republican Revolt (The Atlantic, Jan–Feb 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/Y2CD-TBDZ (tracking the class divide in the Republican Party
through Trump support in the 2016 primary).
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to offer security, redistribution, or optimism about life prospects
for their citizens. That huge numbers of the populations of the
democratic countries no longer trusted in the solidaristic commitment of the society or its capacity to protect them fueled the current populist backlash.
IV. GETTING IT DONE
Democratically produced laws are legitimate and authoritative because they are produced by a procedure with a tendency to
make correct decisions.
—David M. Estlund94
Over the past two centuries, democracies have outfought,
out-innovated, and outproduced their rivals. With singular capacity, democracies raised the living standards of the broad masses
of their populations, raised education levels to permit citizen engagement, and at the same time were able to trust powerful militaries to protect them from foreign assault without succumbing
to military rule. History is obviously much more complicated and
this is a somewhat tendentious reading, but it captures the ideological consensus that prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet
empire and the brief era of presumed democratic universalism.
As Professor Branko Milanovic’s elephant curve chart on income distribution95 shows, however, the optimistic story is under
serious challenge. The China/Singapore models96 of authoritarian
rule coupled with high state competence highlight an emerging
feature of democracies: the presence of multiple veto points blocking the creation of public goods and equitable policies. Mature democracies include mechanisms of transparency, due process, and
participation that provide an entry point for private interests to

94 David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework 8
(Princeton 2008).
95 See note 84 and Figure 2.
96 In Singapore, initial firm state oversight of financial and labor markets coupled
with aggressive solicitation of foreign investment achieved rapid growth in the decades
following independence. See generally W.G. Huff, What Is the Singapore Model of Economic Development?, 19 Camb J Econ 735 (1995). While China’s general rise is well
known, less focus has been placed on its advances in infrastructure. It has spent 8.5 percent of its GDP since the 1990s on infrastructure, and now outpaces both the United States
and the European Union in absolute spending. While gains are lopsided by sector, it has
rapidly built its infrastructure stock to compete with developed nations. See Yougang
Chen, Stefan Matzinger, and Jonathan Woetzel, Chinese Infrastructure: The Big Picture
(McKinsey Q, June 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3U7V-2SF7.
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block undesired governmental action.97 Under such circumstances, it is easier to block than to build and the result is to raise
the costs of public endeavors dramatically. Fukuyama terms this
the rise of “vetocracy,” defined as “a situation in which special interests can veto measures harmful to themselves, while collective
action for the common good becomes exceedingly difficult to
achieve. Vetocracy isn’t fatal to American democracy, but it does
produce poor governance.”98 Easy confirmation can be found in the
wobbly efforts of the Republicans in the US Congress to pass from
a party of opposition to a party of governance on their signature
demand for the repeal of the Affordable Care Act.99 After seven
years of campaigning on a promise to repeal Obamacare, a clear
Republican majority in the House of Representatives had trouble
even proposing legislation to be submitted to a congressional
vote.100
The central claim to superior competence of democracies is
not the process of governance but the outputs that result; deliberation is necessarily slower and more complicated than decree.
At some point, however, deliberation is not a process of citizen
inputs but a public-choice nightmare in which vested sectional interests can marshal resources to overwhelm the passive majority.
The result is a failure of public policy leadership and a collapse
into rewards for privileged access to the strongest forces in government, almost invariably the executive. As I have described the
process elsewhere, “the ‘three C’s’ of consolidated power take hold:
clientelism, cronyism, and corruption.”101 The result is “weak democracies with autocratically minded leaders, who govern
through informal, patronage networks . . . . [C]lientelism binds
many citizens to ruling elites through cooptation and coercion.”102
Such failing democracies have no necessary organizational superiority to more decisive regimes, and indeed the presence of numerous veto points to action may actually make democracies less
capable.
97

See Francis Fukuyama, The Failed State, Prospect 30, 31 (Jan 2017).
Id at 31.
99 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
100 See Alexander Bolton, GOP Facing Likely Failure on ObamaCare Repeal (The
Hill, Sept 25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/M3W9-5SP3 (discussing Congressional
Republicans’ likely prospect of failing in a “nine-month odyssey” to repeal Obamacare).
101 Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies at 158 (cited in note 52).
102 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, The Crisis of Democracy in the Western
Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy *7 (Mar 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/3W9S-3SM8.
98

2018]

Democracy’s Deficits

515

Consider an example from major new airport construction, a
massively complex undertaking that has not even been attempted
in the United States since the opening of the Denver airport in
1995. An international traveler to Beijing cannot help but be
awed by the majestic beauty of the Terminal 3 international arrivals. Built for the opening of the Beijing Olympics, and designed
by English architect Norman Foster, its dramatic arches evoke
both the red lacquer motifs of Imperial China and the bird’s nest
design of the Olympic stadium. The new terminal was constructed, from design to completion, in four years, a massive effort
that included three work crews a day, laboring on rotating eighthour shifts.103
By contrast, compare Terminal 3 with Heathrow’s Terminal 5
in London. Like Terminal 3 in Beijing, Heathrow’s Terminal 5 is
designed by Norman Foster. Yet it is at best functional, a desperately needed additional space for an overcrowded airport. It has
no grandeur, no inspiration, no sense of tribute to a rising
power—and it took twenty years to complete.
When pressed about this in a BBC interview, Foster acknowledged the gains in completion time in China from more efficient
labor use, lower regulatory demands, ease of siting, and a host of
other factors. But even on Foster’s account, there were years of
delay that could not be accounted for. Instead what emerges is the
capacity of Chinese authorities to simply get the job done:
“[Y]ou’ve taken out the democratic process, you’ve taken out the
plan, so that comes down to decision making, it comes down to
having a very, very clear idea of objectives and getting on with
it.”104 At the end of the day, the capacity to produce turned on the
difficulties of democracy, an observation that challenges democratic claims of superior capacity. Thus, Foster contrasts the
British perspective—“[O]h well, it took a long time but we are a
democratic society”—with the societal “hung[er] for change and
[ ] for progress” driving rapid production in China.105
Of course, my home airport in New York is LaGuardia, which
makes Terminal 5 look like paradise. Among New York’s signature contributions to democratic dysfunction is the much ballyhooed opening of the Second Avenue subway extension in 2017, a
mere eighty-eight years after it was initially proposed. Even more
103 BBC Dream Builders with Norman Foster *10 (Foster + Partners, June 16, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/G5V6-W3R7.
104 Id.
105 Id at *10–11.
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striking than the delay were the extravagant costs, themselves a
self-imposed problem of poor governance. Digging a subway in a
dense urban environment necessitates disrupting delivery of gas,
water, telecommunications, and so forth. Doing so efficiently in
turn requires coordination so that service disruptions and alternative sources can be adjusted. The builder of the subway found
coordination among the various utilities and regulatory agencies
that covered each service so daunting that it decided the only solution was to dig deep into the bedrock of Manhattan so as to
avoid having any contact with any other utilities or administrators.106 The result is that more than eighty years after first proposed, the Second Avenue subway finally opened in 2017, encompassing a total of four subway stops, running a grand total of
about three kilometers, and pricing in at a whopping figure of almost $2 billion per kilometer.107
The capacity to cushion the dislocations of the modern global
economy and the press of immigration is another measure of state
competence. Germany’s capacity to integrate the former East
Germany confirms the difficulty of the enterprise, even among
people who already shared a language and a clear national identity. It is here that all the themes of democratic stress come together. The inability of institutional political actors to debate policy, to appeal to collective interest, and to assure through
competent leadership all drain the vitality of the democratic project. Populist anger is stoked by state incompetence and increased
clientelism for those with privileged access to the executive.
Weakened forms of participation and deliberation, in turn, compound the sense of democratic failure.
CONCLUSION
The picture of democracy presented here is certainly somber,
but it need not be funereal. The identified deficits in democratic
governance are serious, no doubt. But the advanced industrial democracies are sophisticated societies with great internal resources. Three are worth noting here because they are significant
sources of resilience. Undoubtedly there are many more, but these

106 Matthew Yglesias, NYC’s Brand New Subway Is the Most Expensive in the World—
That’s a Problem (Vox, Jan 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/XT5A-BJJZ.
107 See Alon Levy, US Rail Construction Costs (Pedestrian Observations, May 16,
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/MNW2-RWKB.
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three flow immediately from the discussion above, and the last
points back to the rule of law, a topic thus far not addressed.
First, waves of populist anger tend to be conjunctural. The
immediate spark for the latest political tide appears to be the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008. Economic recovery is the
likeliest source of any easing of enraged politics. But populist reaction translates poorly into governance, as the US Republican
Party has shown in its hesitating transition from opposition to
ruling. The current populist wave began at least a decade earlier
in Latin America than in Europe or the United States, and it is
now sputtering out amid corruption scandals and the inability to
achieve deliverance.
Second, democratic states abound in civil-society institutions
that resist the anti-liberalism of caudillo politics. One of the main
failings of the Founding constitutional vision in the United States
was the lack of any space for intermediating institutions that
stood between the state and the citizenry. Tocqueville’s observations about the notable abundance of association in the young
Republic may be generalized to all democratic countries, including the more state-oriented political orders of Europe. Even a
strict Montesquieu-inspired division of government powers
proved not to anticipate the manner in which democratic societies
function. From the press to community associations to political
parties to churches there is far more resilience than just a formal
account of the separation of powers between the legislature and
the executive.
Third, democratic societies develop thick legal institutions
bounded by the rule of law. Moments of populist passion confront
constitutional constraints and the restraining force of constitutional courts, as I addressed at length in Fragile Democracies.108
The Brexit vote provides a useful illustration. Although advocacy
for popular initiatives in Britain has a long history, going back at
least to Professor A.V. Dicey more than a century ago,109 the process is relatively unutilized and the relation between the subjects
of referendum and ensuing governmental action remains unclear.
As the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution concluded, “[W]e regret the ad hoc manner in which referendums
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See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies at 189–278 (cited in note 52).
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57 Contemp Rev 489 (1890).
109

518

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:485

have been used, often as a tactical device, by the government of
the day.”110
In the aftermath of Brexit, Prime Minister Cameron departed
the scene and a chastened Tory government formed under Prime
Minister Theresa May, itself further weakened by a disastrous
gamble on rapid-fire elections. The government allowed the
Brexit vote to stand as the will of the people and took the first
steps toward unwinding Britain’s participation in the European
Union. This provoked a legal challenge leading to a remarkable
discussion in the UK Supreme Court on the nature of British
democratic governance. In an approach that hearkens back to
Justice Jackson’s careful dissection of the delicate balance of powers between the executive and the legislature, the Court framed
the inquiry: “[The] Act envisages domestic law, and therefore
rights of UK citizens, changing as EU law varies, but it does not
envisage those rights changing as a result of ministers unilaterally deciding that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the
EU Treaties.”111
That a weak government had appealed directly over the head
of Parliament to enraged voters did not alter the institutional
commitments to the democratic supremacy of Parliament. Nor
could the prime minister invoke plebiscitary approval as a substitute for proper institutional process:
The question is whether that domestic starting point, introduced by Parliament, can be set aside, or could have been intended to be set aside, by a decision of the UK executive without express Parliamentary authorisation. We cannot accept
that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can
be achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only
way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow
from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to the present issue.112
Rule-of-law principles may not serve to brake the more worrisome manifestations of populist anger. In some countries, as in

110 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Referendums in the United
Kingdom: Report with Evidence, (HL Paper 99, 2009–2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/XX64-D9ES.
111 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5,
*28 at ¶ 83.
112 Id at *28 at ¶ 82.
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Hungary and increasingly in Poland, the institutions may be
overwhelmed by the concerted forces of politics. But they can provide a necessary challenge and an avenue of repair. In the words
of the US court confronting the Trump administration’s proposed
travel bans and the administration’s claims to unaccountable executive discretion:
There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our
constitutional democracy.
...
[Our cases] make clear, courts can and do review constitutional challenges to the substance and implementation of immigration policy.
...
[T]he Government’s “authority and expertise in [such] matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to
secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals,” even in times of war.113

113 Washington v Trump, 847 F3d 1151, 1161–63 (9th Cir 2017) (per curiam), quoting
Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 1, 34 (2010).

